Animal ethics theories aim to provide arguments in favor of assigning a moral status to non-human animals (all or some of them) and, consequently, of transforming or abolishing some of the ways in which humans interact with them. Therefore, philosophical analysis regarding animals’ moral status aims at fostering moral progress in the field of human/animal relationships. According to a basic and naturalized definition of moral progress, this takes place when sympathy is extended to subjects previously ignored or underestimated. From this perspective, the current state of affairs in human/animal relationships is puzzling. On the one hand, philosophical and public debate on the moral status of animals is spreading as never before (and this has led also to some legal protection of animals). On the other hand, the number of animals being exploited and killed by humans for food has reached unprecedented levels (i.e. the 62% of mammals’ biomass on Earth today is primarily made up of livestock). A distinction between a “conceptual” dimension of moral progress and a “factual” one could thus help animal ethics to deal with this puzzling context.
Animal ethics theories aim to provide arguments in favor of assigning a moral status to non-human animals (all or some of them) and, consequently, of transforming or abolishing some of the ways in which humans interact with them. Indeed, human-animal relations today are a subject of public discussion in society, policymaking, and the law. If the aim of animal ethics philosophers is to help to transform animals’ moral status and to reform human/animal relations, then it must be acknowledged that, at least prima facie, this aim has partly been achieved (mostly in democratic and more economically developed countries). For example, the European Union’s Lisbon Treaty (a sort of constitutional amendment for Europe) recognizes animals as “sentient beings” and prescribes that the various uses to which animals are put is only permitted if…
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