This paper contributes to the debate about the nature of mental content from the perspective of the neuroscience of consciousness. In particular, I consider how one of the most influential neuroscientific theories of consciousness, the integrated information theory (IIT), understands the relation between consciousness and content. I conclude that it implies a form of phenomenal intentionality theory (PIT), the view that consciousness explanatorily grounds content, and for this reason proponents of PIT could find in IIT a neuroscientific ally. My main conclusion is that a higher degree of confidence in IIT should accompany a higher degree of confidence in PIT. In section 2, I show that major neuroscientific theories of consciousness implicitly commit to representationalism, the view that content explanatorily grounds consciousness. In section 3, I briefly present IIT, so to give the reader the necessary tools to understand the mechanics of my argument. In section 4, I argue that IIT implies a version of PIT, and that its theoretical apparatus could be re-interpreted to formulate a theory of content. In section 5, I argue that IIT is a form of PIT, which I will call ‘structuralist PIT’. In Section 6, I claim that IIT has the resources to push against the objection that non-conscious representations falsify PIT in general. I conclude that in virtue of this, proponents of PIT and IIT could work together to develop a more refined version of IIT as a theory of content, because if IIT turns out to be the correct theory of consciousness, this would help PIT too.