In this paper I will attempt to show that there are some essential connections between essence and knowledge, and to clarify their nature. I start by showing how the standard Finean counterexamples to a purely modal conception of essence suggest that, among necessary properties, those that are counted as essential have a strong epistemic value. I will then propose a “modal-epistemic” account of essence that takes the essential properties of an object to be precisely the sub-set of its necessary properties that constitute a significant source of knowledge about it. I will then argue that this view is supported by an inference to the best explanation that starts from some uncontroversial, although sometimes neglected, epistemic roles essences should play.
In this paper I will defend the thesis that the essence of something just is a set of cognitively significant properties with a certain modal profile. More precisely, an essential property of x is a necessary property of x which constitutes a significant source of knowledge about x. And the essence of x is a set of essential properties, ideally sufficient for individuating x, which is as far as possible simple and informative. Because the picture I want to draw is very ample, I will often have to paint with a very broad brush. But the connections I wish to highlight only emerge at this very general level, and I believe this is the reason why they are too easily…
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