According to many philosophers, even if it is metaphysically possible that I exist without my present body or without my present brain, it is not metaphysically possible that I exist without any physical support. Thus, it is not metaphysically possible that I exist in some afterlife world, where I do not have any physical support. I shall argue against such a thesis by distinguishing two different notions of physical and by examining two strategies used by those who defend the thesis. No strategy will turn out to be conclusive. Thus, it seems that nothing excludes the metaphysical possibility of disembodied existence. Moreover, I shall illustrate two ways (respectively based on modal realism and on modal actualism) in which one might conclude that my disembodied existence is something more than a mere possibility.
Most versions of non-reductive physicalism (the contemporary received view in ontology of mind) seemingly imply the following: even if it is metaphysically possible that I exist without my present body or without my present brain, it is not metaphysically possible that I exist without any physical support at all. Namely, it is not metaphysically possible that I have disembodied existence.
Consider the metaphysical possibility of our friend Anthony’s disembodied existence. We can interpret this suggestion as follows:
(no-dis.) it is not metaphysically possible that Anthony exists and that there is no object such that that object is a physical object and it stands in the relation of embodying with Anthony (i.e., it is Anthony’s physical support).
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