Argumenta – Journal of Analytic Philosophy

This article sketches a pragmatist method for metaphysics. Bottom-up or descriptive metaphysics describes the domains of quantification, essences and the categories of a linguistic activity by describing the linguistic activities of encountering reality and seeking and finding objects and relationships. Constructive or top-down metaphysics constructs alternative conceptual schemes, which can be used as world-view backgrounds to construct scientific paradigms and theories. Metaphysical theories are then assessed by comparing the research traditions that arise when the theories are used as conceptual schemes. The pragmatic circle can be generalized into a world-view circle of forming a conceptual scheme, articulating the scheme and drawing interpretations, and assessing and modifying the world-view. Different metaphysical conceptual schemes can be contrasted through a dialogue between languages, which allows a comparison of how different metaphysical frameworks can recognize reality and offer good models for being qua being.

Metaphysics has been questioned since the 18th century Enlightenment and its foundational projects (see, e.g., KrV, H). Similar questions about the scientific status of metaphysics have been raised in recent debates (see Ladyman 2007, Morganti and Tahko 2017, Snellman 2023). This article offers a sketch of metaphysical methodology by building connections between language-games, quantification, world-views and frameworks for scientific research. These connections then offer an approach that leads to bottom-up descriptive metaphysics and constructive or top-down metaphysics as framework construction. Different metaphysical systems are connected with Kuhnian world-views or frameworks, which are then…

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