This paper presents a conceptual analysis of Wittgenstein’s use of the notions of habit and custom. References to habit and custom abound in Wittgenstein’s writings already from the 1930s, but no particular focus has been placed on his actual use of these notions. The aim of the paper is to provide a preliminary conceptual tool useful for developing a fruitful engagement between Wittgenstein’s “post-tractarian” philosophy and contributions to the philosophy of habit. To do this, I will first trace relevant occurrences in Wittgenstein’s writings. Secondly, I will map the use of these concepts by identifying three related families of German expressions: Gepflogenheit, Gewohnheit and Gebrauch/Sitte. Finally, I will present three philosophical contexts in which the two notions play an important role: 1. remarks on rule-following; 2. imaginary cases; 3. meta-philosophical remarks on philosophical problems. I will conclude that Wittgenstein’s reference to habit and custom is an important element of his anthropological or pragmatic turn.