Argumenta – Journal of Analytic Philosophy

In this paper I face the issue of eliminativism about race. I suggest that a partial as opposed to a blank eliminativism is the epistemically correct philosophical position, by remarking that there are different concepts of “race” and for each of them different philosophical and scientific considerations apply. I first introduce the eliminativist position and show that different forms of eliminativism exist; I then examine how distinct kinds of eliminativism apply to the concept of “bio-genomic” and “social race”, respectively, across different scientific fields. I conclude that while the concept…

Most philosophers think that phenomenal consciousness is real and that it has two components: an experiential component—a state that is subjectively ‘like something’ for a subject of experience; and a cognitive component—the subject’s awareness of the experiential component and knowledge of what it’s like. Illusionists, by contrast, claim that phenomenal consciousness is an illusion. It does not exist but only seems to exist (Frankish 2016). Although illusionism is highly counterintuitive, I shall claim that it is probably true. For I shall argue that phenomenal realism—the view that phenomenal consciousness is…