The Debate on the Problem of For-Me-Ness: A Proposed Taxonomy
Issue: Issue 15 • Author/s: Alberto Barbieri
Topics: Cognitive science, Epistemology, Philosophy of mind
Several philosophers claim that a mental state is phenomenally conscious only if it exhibits so-called for-me-ness, or subjective character, i.e., the fact that there is something it is like to be in a conscious state not just for everyone but only for the subject who undergoes it. Consequently, they stress, a proper explanation of consciousness requires to address the question of what the nature of for-me-ness is. This question forms what I call the problem of for-me-ness. Although the debate on the problem of for-me-ness has assumed a centre stage…
Taking Phenomenology at Face Value: The Priority of State Consciousness in Light of the For-me-ness of Experience [Special Issue]
Issue: Issue 18 • Author/s: Alberto Barbieri
Topics: Epistemology, Metaphysics, Philosophy of mind, Theoretical philosophy
An important distinction lies between consciousness attributed to creatures, or subjects, (creature consciousness) and consciousness attributed to mental states (state consciousness). Most contemporary theories of consciousness aim at explaining what makes a mental state conscious, paying scant attention to the problem of creature consciousness. This attitude relies on a deeper, and generally overlooked, assumption that once an explanation of state consciousness is provided, one has also explained all the relevant features of creature consciousness. I call this the priority of state consciousness thesis (PSC). In this paper, I want to…