Future Contingents, Open Futurism, and Ontic Indeterminacy [Critical Discussion]
Issue: Issue 17 • Author/s: Giuseppe Spolaore
Topics: Epistemology, Metaphysics, Modal Logic, Philosophical logic, Philosophy of language, Theoretical philosophy
This paper critically discusses Patrick Todd’s book, The Open Future: Why Future Contingents Are All False (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021).
Between Gareth Evans and Bill Evans: Andrea Bonomi’s Multi-Propositionalism [Critical Note]
Issue: Issue 18 • Author/s: Carlo Penco
Topics: Metaphysics, Philosophical logic, Philosophy of language, Philosophy of Time, Theoretical philosophy
Evans claims that a sentence should always be considered correct or incorrect at the time of its utterance, to preserve what is called the “stability principle”. To introduce the debate, I refer to some remarks by Kamangar and Perry, who show how Frege could have treated future contingents in a way that would contrast Evans’ claim. I then discuss the more traditional contrast between Frege and Prior on different conceptions of propositions that lies at the core of Evans’ view, and I show how Dummett seems to find a compromise…