Is Psychologism Unavoidable in a Phenomenologically Adequate Account of Mental Content? [Special Issue]
Issue: Issue 18 • Author/s: Elisabetta Sacchi
Topics: Epistemology, Metaphysics, Philosophy of language, Philosophy of mind, Theoretical philosophy
In my paper I focus on psychologism in the theory of mental content and critically consider a variety of it—“intentional psychologism” (Pitt 2009)—that has recently entered the stage in the philosophy of mind literature. My aim is twofold. First, I want to provide a critical evaluation of this new variety of psychologism, considering in particular whether it is immune from (some of) the most famous classical criticisms. Secondly, I want to provide a diagnosis of what ultimately motivates the current revival of the “psychologistic attitude”. My aim in so doing…
Consciousness and Content from the Perspective of the Integrated Information Theory [Special Issue]
Issue: Issue 18 • Author/s: Niccolò Bruno Negro
Topics: Cognitive science, Epistemology, Metaphysics, Philosophy of mind, Theoretical philosophy
This paper contributes to the debate about the nature of mental content from the perspective of the neuroscience of consciousness. In particular, I consider how one of the most influential neuroscientific theories of consciousness, the integrated information theory (IIT), understands the relation between consciousness and content. I conclude that it implies a form of phenomenal intentionality theory (PIT), the view that consciousness explanatorily grounds content, and for this reason proponents of PIT could find in IIT a neuroscientific ally. My main conclusion is that a higher degree of confidence in…