Argumenta – Journal of Analytic Philosophy

In this paper, we explore the interplay between moral expertise and moral understanding. Specifically, by focusing on moral understanding rather than on moral knowledge, whether there is a way to rethink moral expertise without embracing moral realism will be assessed. The main theoretical gain is that an understanding-based account of moral expertise can explain why moral testimony is suspicious, while the standard account cannot. In this respect, for an understanding-based account of moral expertise to really count as an alternative to realist and knowledge-based ones, some points have to be…

This paper outlines my theory of moral perception, extends the theory beyond its previous statements, and defends it from a number of objections posed in the literature. The paper distinguishes the perceptible from the perceptual; develops a structural analogy between perception and action; explains how moral perception, despite its normative status, can be causal in the way appropriate to genuine perception; clarifies the respects in which moral perception is representational; and indicates how it provides an objective basis for moral knowledge. In the light of this account of moral perception,…