Argumenta – Journal of Analytic Philosophy

Parfit argues that if we come to believe his theory of personal identity, we should care differently about the future. Amongst others, we can redescribe death in ways that make it seem less bad. I consider three challenges to his reasoning. First, according to the Argument from Above, a fact, event, or state of affairs can be good or bad independently of the value or disvalue of its constituents. Death could thus be bad even if R-relatedness matters and some degree of it is gets preserved. Second, I argue that…

Eric Olson has made an important addition to the discussion started by Parfit of the argument from the possibility of fission to the unimportance of personal identity. Olson’s discussion is challenging. I want, more briefly, to highlight what is the most important consequence of it. This is that it is metaphysically impossible, impossible in the strongest sense, that any version of Parfit’s argument from fission can yield his conclusion. Olson argues specifically that this is impossible if what he calls a ‘capacious ontology’ is assumed. I argue that it is…