Argumenta – Journal of Analytic Philosophy

 

Virtue, Character, and Moral Responsibility: Against the Monolithic View

Issue: Issue 17 • Author/s: Giulia Luvisotto, Johannes Roessler
Topics: Ethics, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of action, Theoretical philosophy

A traditional tenet of virtue ethics is that a proper moral assessment of an action needs to be informed by a view of the agent; in particular, a view of their virtues or vices, as exhibited in their action. This picture has been challenged on the grounds that it is revisionary and ill-motivated. The key claim is that we are ordinarily disposed to judge the moral merits of particular actions independently of any view of the character of the agent, and that there is nothing wrong with that practice. In this paper, we identify…

Wilson on Metaphysical Emergence [Book Symposium]

Issue: Issue 19 • Author/s: Brian P. McLaughlin
Topics: Metaphysics, Moral Philosophy, Ontology, Philosophy of mind, Philosophy of science

I critically examine Jessica Wilson’s views concerning the relationship between Weak emergence and Physicalism and between Strong emergence and Physicalism, and also her defense of libertarian free will in Metaphysical Emergence (2021).

Agency without Action: On Responsibility for Omissions

Issue: Issue 19 • Author/s: Sofia Bonicalzi, Mario De Caro
Topics: Epistemology, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of action, Theoretical philosophy

In the last few years, there has been a growing philosophical interest in the problem of moral responsibility for omissions. Like actions, however, omissions are not all-of-a-kind. Recently, most of the research effort in this field has been devoted to the so-called unwitting omissions. However, in some cases, people make clear-eyed, or quasi-clear-eyed, decisions about not interfering with a given course of action potentially having unethical consequences (let’s call these decisions witting omissions). In this paper, we abstract away from the epistemic concerns that typically refer to unwitting omissions to…

Our Admiration for Exemplars and the Impartial Spectator Perspective: Moral Exemplarism and Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments

Issue: Issue 19 • Author/s: Karsten R. Stueber
Topics: Epistemology, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of action, Theoretical philosophy

This essay will discuss the philosophical viability of Linda Zagzebski’s refreshingly radical theory of moral exemplarism that attempts to elucidate the nature of human morality through an analysis of the structure of our admiration for morally exemplary individuals. After raising some systematic worries about exemplarism, I will turn to Adam Smith and his Theory of Moral Sentiments. There are indeed strands in Smith’s thoughts that contain an exemplarist flavor. Nevertheless, from the Smithian perspective that I favor, our moral concepts emerge from the everyday practice of holding each other morally…

Human Enhancement and Reproductive Ethics on Generation Ships

Issue: Issue 19 • Author/s: Steven Umbrello, Maurizio Balistreri
Topics: Ecology, Ethics, Moral Philosophy

The past few years have seen a resurgence in the public interest in space flight and travel. Spurred mainly by the likes of technology billionaires like Elon Musk and Jeff Bezos, the topic poses both unique scientific as well as ethical challenges. This paper looks at the concept of generation ships, conceptual behemoth ships whose goal is to bring a group of human settlers to distant exoplanets. These ships are designed to host multiple generations of people who will be born, live, and die on these ships long before they…
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