Issue: Issue 14 • Author/s: Giulia Casini
Topics: Epistemology, Metaphysics, Modal Logic, Ontology, Philosophical logic
In her book Potentiality: From Dispositions to Modality (2015), Barbara Vetter introduces a new ontological and semantical framework for modal discourse, based on potentiality. Within this framework, Vetter attempts to formulate an embryonic semantical account for counterfactual conditionals. The aim of this paper is to discuss this tentative account of counterfactuals. Being an account at such an early stage, there are many elements and issues that could be discussed, but this work will focus only on one aspect of it. The aspect in question is the treatment of would-counterfactuals, which…
Issue: Issue 14 • Author/s: Brian Garrett
Topics: Epistemology, Metaphysics, Ontology
In this discussion I point out that Max Black offers not one but two arguments against the (logical/metaphysical) possibility of backwards causation. Although both arguments fail in their intended aim, they show something of importance, viz., that defenders of backwards causation should understand Black’s Houdini example (and others like it) in terms of the ‘multiple causes’ model.
Issue: Issue 14 • Author/s: Elvira Di Bona
Topics: Aesthetics, Cognitive science, Epistemology, Ontology, Philosophy of language
The issue of whether we can auditorily perceive meanings (or semantic properties) expressed in a language we understand has been approached through arguments based either on theoretical reasoning or the discussion of psychological effects. I am skeptical about the use of either type of argument. In this paper, I will first explain the limitations of the standard theoretical argument: the phenomenal contrast method. As for psychological phenomena, I will discuss semantic satiation and the Stroop effect. I will summarize why semantic satiation has already been dismissed and, based on said…
Issue: Issue 16 • Author/s: Emanuele Rossanese
Topics: Epistemology, Logic, Metaphysics, Ontology, Philosophy of science
Da Costa, Lombardi and Lastiri (2013) have proposed an ontology of properties for non-relativistic quantum mechanics within the structure of the modal-Hamiltonian interpretation of the theory. Recently, this proposal has been developed in order to discuss the nature of entanglement and indistinguishability in such an ontology (Fortin and Lombardi 2022) and to explain how particles emerge from an ontology of properties (Lombardi and Dieks 2016). Oldofredi (2021) has also proposed an ontology of properties for Relational Quantum Mechanics. The aim of my paper is then to discuss an ontology of…
Issue: Issue 18 • Author/s: Anna Giustina
Topics: Cognitive science, Epistemology, Metaphysics, Ontology, Philosophy of mind, Theoretical philosophy
Conscious intentional states are mental states that represent things as being a certain way and do so consciously: they involve a phenomenally conscious representation. For any phenomenally conscious state, there is something it is like for its subject to be in it. The way it is like for a subject to be in a certain phenomenal state is the state’s phenomenal character. According to some authors, phenomenal character has two components: qualitative character (i.e., the “what it is like” component) and subjective character (the “for the subject” component). Elsewhere, I…
Issue: Issue 19 • Author/s: Tom Schoonen
Topics: Epistemology, Modal Logic, Ontology, Theoretical philosophy
In an impressive feat of combining modal metaphysics with fundamental quantum mechanics, Wilson (2020) presents a new genuine realist metaphysics of modality: Quantum Modal Realism. One of the main motivations for Wilson’s project is to do better than existent realist metaphysics of modality with regards to epistemic challenge: we should be able to explain our knowledge of modality. In this paper, I will argue that there is a significant worry for the epistemology of Wilson’s modal metaphysics, one that parallels Rosen’s objection to Lewis genuine modal realism. That is, quantum…
Issue: Issue 19 • Author/s: Daniele Sgaravatti
Topics: Epistemology, Metaphysics, Modal Logic, Ontology, Theoretical philosophy
In this paper I will attempt to show that there are some essential connections between essence and knowledge, and to clarify their nature. I start by showing how the standard Finean counterexamples to a purely modal conception of essence suggest that, among necessary properties, those that are counted as essential have a strong epistemic value. I will then propose a “modal-epistemic” account of essence that takes the essential properties of an object to be precisely the sub-set of its necessary properties that constitute a significant source of knowledge about it.…
Issue: Issue 19 • Author/s: Francesca Bellazzi
Topics: Metaphysics, Ontology, Philosophy of Biology, Philosophy of language, Philosophy of Medicine, Philosophy of science
This paper will consider how the account of weak emergence presented by Wilson in the book Metaphysical emergence (2021) can be used to explore the relation between biochemical functions and chemical structure in biochemical molecules, as vitamin B12. The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 will introduce why biochemical functions are interesting from a philosophical perspective and why their relation to molecular structure can be seen as problematic. In doing so, it will consider the definition of biochemical functions as in Bellazzi (2022) for which they can…
Issue: Issue 19 • Author/s: Karen Bennett
Topics: Metaphysics, Ontology
Wilson characterizes weak and strong emergence partly based on their differing solutions to the exclusion problem. The weak emergentist should claim that emergent phenomena and their bases can both cause the same effect without overdetermining it, because they literally share causal powers. I compare this strategy with a different but related strategy also available to the weak emergentist, and argue that the virtues of the former cost more than it appears.