Argumenta – Journal of Analytic Philosophy

 

Against Counterexamples to Hypothetical Syllogism

Issue: • Author/s: Eddie W.L. Cheng
Topics: Epistemology, Philosophical logic, Philosophy of language, Philosophy of logic

A hypothetical syllogism with three conditional propositions (hereinafter HSc) is considered invalid according to the ordinary discourse counterexamples in the existing literature. In this paper, I argue that such counterexamples cannot verify the validity of HSc. The conditional propositions in these arguments are questionable, whether that is indicative or counterfactual HSc. The arguments are considered invalid not because HSc is invalid by itself, but because there is a mismatch between the antecedent of one premise and the consequent of another premise (i.e. a violation of the common part of both…

Between Science and Logic: Securing the Legitimacy of Analytic Metaphysics [Special Issue]

Issue: Issue 19 • Author/s: Andrea Strollo
Topics: Epistemology, Metaphysics, Ontology, Philosophy of logic, Philosophy of science, Theoretical philosophy

Analytic metaphysics has been criticized for its dubious epistemological status. Today, anti-metaphysical sentiments often promote naturalized metaphysics as the only viable way to metaphysical theorizing. In this paper, I argue that analytic metaphysics (or at least a significant portion of it) has the same kind of legitimacy that naturalized metaphysics exhibits. I first point out that naturalized metaphysics is secured by the de facto legitimacy of natural science and its continuity with it. Then, I argue that analytic metaphysics can pursue a similar strategy by relying on the de facto…

The Feasibility Approach to Imagination as a Guide to Metaphysical Modality [Special Issue]

Issue: Issue 19 • Author/s: Daniel Dohrn
Topics: Epistemology, Metaphysics, Modal Logic, Ontology, Philosophy of logic, Theoretical philosophy

I present a novel approach to modal imagination as a means of knowing metaphysical possibilities. Hume calls the link between imagining and possibility an ‘established maxim’. I ask: what makes it seem so natural to use imagination as a guide to modality? (1.) I draw some lessons on my motivational question from the current debate. (2.) I develop my answer: we use imagination to creatively simulate solutions to feasibility issues. (2.1.) To corroborate my answer, I consider everyday feasibility issues. (2.2.) I then extend the account to more remote feasibility…